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The Impact of Immigration on Election Outcomes in 
Danish Municipalities 
 
In this paper we study the effects on support for different political parties due to an increase 
in the immigrant share in Danish municipalities during the period 1989-2001. We find that the 
immigrant share has some notable effects. The anti-immigration parties are among those that 
win votes when the immigrant share increases, but a pro-immigration party on the left also 
gains from an increase in the immigrant share. The non-socialist party that is most pro-
immigration, however, loses votes when the immigrant share increases. Our results indicate 
that in the elections some Danish voters voice their displeasure about immigration in their 
own neighbourhood. But we find no clear indication of a general decline in support for the 
welfare state on account of immigration, as several scholars have been predicting. 
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 Introduction
∗
In this paper we study the effect of an influx of immigrants on political parties in Denmark. In 
particular, we examine the effect of a change in the demographic composition in Danish 
municipalities. In doing so we consider an exogenous change in immigration patterns dating 
back to an unprecedented influx of refugees and their placement in the municipalities in 
accordance with established legal regulations. With the help of regression estimations we seek 
to discover whether or not such a change in the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ 
significantly affected election outcomes. We study election results for 275 municipalities 
during the period 1989-2001, covering altogether four local elections and four elections to 
Parliament. Taking the platforms of the different political parties as a proxy for their positions 
on immigration and welfare state issues, we seek to identify the impact of immigration on 
support for the Danish welfare state. What motivates such a study and, in particular, what 
makes the Danish case interesting even to the non-Danish reader? This introduction is 
devoted to clarifying the aims and objectives of the study. 
 
Immigration, and the situation of immigrants, has become a political issue in most West 
European countries. It is generally the immigration of non-Western rather than Western 
immigrants that has been the main subject of debate. Surveys show that many natives feel 
negative about the present situation with respect to immigration and immigrants. A fairly new 
expression of this is the establishment and expansion of anti-immigration political parties. 
Such parties have been receiving wide political support in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
and Norway, for example, as well as in Denmark which is the subject of the present study. 
These parties advocate a very restrictive policy on immigration, with proposals aiming to 
reduce the influx of immigrants and to encourage return migration, as well as measures to 
reduce income transfers and to dismantle programs aimed at immigrants.  
 
This development has led researchers from several disciplines to study various aspects of the 
situation. One of these concerns the supporters of the anti-immigration policy: who are they? 
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  1Studies reveal variations based on education, gender, age etc.
1 An expanding area of research 
concerns the way the economic (or perceived economic) impact on different groups may 
explain the difference in attitudes towards immigration. The (perceived) economic effects are 
usually one of two types: labour market effects (wages, unemployment) or effects on the 
economy of the public sector. Immigrants are often unskilled or, if they are skilled, they tend 
to work in occupations mainly for the unskilled, very often because they lack country-specific 
human capital. According to standard economic models, skilled natives gain from 
immigration – at least when they and the unskilled group complement one another in the 
production process. Immigration will generate higher wages as well as lower prices for certain 
types of services, and may thus be supported. Unskilled native workers, on the other hand, 
may fear losing as the result of an influx of immigrants, as they are substitutes in the 
production process. This may add to the risk of unemployment and lower wages, and thus to a 
more negative view of immigration and immigrants.
2
 
The effects for the public sector may also vary from group to group. An influx of non-
Western immigrants (refugees and family-related migration) generates a net transfer to this 
group of immigrants as they have low employment rates. A rise in the net transfer may be 
financed by higher taxes paid largely by people with jobs and especially by those with well-
paid jobs.
3 This may be a factor leading to resistance to immigration among those who are 
employed and who have relatively high wages, especially under a progressive tax system. 
Another way of financing the net transfer to immigrants is to reduce the replacement rates in 
the income transfer programs, for example by lowering the replacement rates for the 
unemployed or social welfare rates. Ultimately the fulfilment of such a measure would mean 
shrinking the welfare state. And this in turn might mean that those citizens who receive 
income transfers would oppose immigration even more strongly. Thus, such effects 
(perceived or real) may also leave their mark on the political scene as well, for example, with 
immigration encouraging the rise of new anti-immigration parties or the growth of those 
already existing as immigrant numbers rise.
4 One main purpose of the present study is to 
explore whether there is such a causal relation between an increase in immigration and 
                                                 
1 See Dustmann and Preston (2001), Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2002), Norris (2005, Chapter 8), Facchini and 
Mayda (2006), Tamura (2006), Malchow-Møller et al. (2007) and Mayda (2007). 
2 Most studies show little or no effects on native wages and unemployment as a result of immigration. For 
surveys, see Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2005 and 2006). A notable exception is Borjas (2003), reporting a 
negative impact of Mexican immigrants on the wages of low-skilled US workers. 
3 See Facchini and Mayda (2006) and Tamura (2006). 
4 On the relation between the size of immigration and the effects on wages, unemployment and the public sector 
finances, see also Tamura (2007). 
  2support for anti-immigration parties. With this in view we consider whether a rise in the share 
of immigrants in Danish municipalities does increase the support for anti-immigrant parties. 
 
The effects of immigration on the public sector depend on the system for financing the 
various activities. If transfers are financed by the state, there is no reason to expect greater 
local resistance to immigration on financial grounds in municipalities with many immigrants. 
On the other hand, if the municipalities bear a large part of the financial burden, we should 
expect to find more support for anti-immigration parties in municipalities with many 
immigrants. In Denmark the municipalities assume the greater part of the costs, see Wadensjö 
and Orrje (2002) and Wadensjö (2007). Support for anti-immigration parties may also depend 
on which public authority is responsible for the rules that determine the immigration 
regulations. In Denmark, immigration policy (the number of immigrant visas granted and the 
distribution of refugees along the line of the placement policy) and the distribution of its costs 
are both determined at the national level by the government and national Parliament. We 
should thus expect the national elections to provide the main forum for the anti-immigration 
parties. If the government is responsible for immigration policy, the effect of immigration on 
support for the political parties may also depend on whether or not these are currently in 
power. From the outset, we can thus envisage various processes at the local and national 
levels whereby immigration affects support for the parties – and especially those with an anti-
immigration agenda. In addressing such issues we will seek to determine whether the effects 
of immigration in the municipalities differ, as between local and general elections. 
 
Economic arguments may thus affect the immigration debate and may help to explain some of 
the variation in individual attitudes towards immigration and the support for anti-immigration 
political parties.
5 However, there may be other factors behind attitudes and immigration 
policies, not least the possible importance of xenophobia in parts of the electorate.
6 Among 
other things, resentments against immigrants have been used to explain different outcomes in 
publicly provided welfare state designs. For example, Lee and Roemer (2006) address “the 
problem of American exceptionalism”, which refers to the rather meagre redistribution of 
income and provision of publicly provided goods in the US. They note that several 
                                                 
5 Economic arguments and individual characteristics explain only part of the cross-country variation in 
individual attitudes towards immigration. See Malchow-Møller et al. (2007). See also Mayda (2007) for another 
cross-country study of the variation in attitudes. 
6 Xenophobia denotes “an unreasonable fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers or of that which is foreign or 
strange”, see http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/xenophobia. 
  3researchers have suggested a more general anti-solidarity effect as an important explanation, 
claiming that lack of compassion for the poor has been a major cause of the notable difference 
between the Europe and the US welfare systems.
7 Lee and Roemer (2006) offer another 
explanation, emphasizing the importance of the policy bundling of political issues stemming 
from the constitutional design in the US regarding majority representation. Their idea is that 
the anti-redistributive Republican Party, which is also the party known to be more restrictive 
on immigration issues, gets the votes of a white, low-skilled electorate that is not against 
redistribution as such, but does give the race question high priority. The authors argue that 
almost half the effect that has been attributed to anti-solidarity sentiment is actually 
determined by racial and xenophobic concerns rather than by any fundamental desire to limit 
the role of the state. A related study by Roemer and Van der Straeten (2006) predict that the 
shift in the Danish government induced by the immigration debate will lead to a significant 
reduction of the welfare state.
8   
 
The paper is designed as follows. The following section provides a political “map” of 
Denmark, in particular of the parties’ stance with respect to migration issues and support for 
the welfare state. The following sections comprise the empirical analysis, starting with a 
variance decomposition of the different party vote shares that is aimed to explore the 
importance of factors emerging on the local level, followed by regression estimations that 
seek to pinpoint the impact of an increase in the share of non-Western immigrants on the 
parties’ vote shares. The final section offers some concluding comments.  
The political parties in Denmark 
The subject of our study is the election results of the political parties in Denmark. Below we 
briefly introduce the political parties that participated in the elections during the period 
studied, presenting them in the order in which they were established on the Danish political 
scene.
9 The following is a broad classification of the political sphere in Denmark with respect 
to the two policy dimensions that we are interested in: 
1.  Against high taxes, negative regarding the immigration issue 
2.  Against high taxes, neutral regarding the immigration issue 
3.  Neutral regarding high taxes, positive regarding the immigration issue 
                                                 
7 They refer particularly to Alesina et al. (2001) as a major source for their findings in the related literature. 
8 See also Roemer, Lee and Van der Straeten (2007), which includes several studies on the connection between 
immigration and support for the welfare state.  
9 See Table A1 for the percentage distribution of the votes in more recent national elections. 
  44.  Pro high taxes, negative regarding the immigration issue 
5.  Pro high taxes, neutral on the immigration  issue 
6.  Pro high taxes, positive regarding the immigration issue 
This rather simple classification provides the basis for mapping-out the different positions and 
their respective political counterpart. By “against high taxes” we mean being in favour of 
reducing tax rates and at the same time cutting back on the welfare state. Similarly, by 
“negative on the immigration issue” we denote a position that seeks to attract the voters who 
favour a more restrictive policy towards immigration. This classification is obviously rather 
broad, covering a fairly wide range of positions, from expressing some concern about 
immigration to favouring anti-immigration legislation. 
 
The oldest of the Danish political parties is the Konservative Folkeparti (Conservative 
People’s Party), which started as the ruling party after the king lost power in Denmark in the 
mid-19th century.
10 It represented the upper classes. The name of the party at that time 
translates as the Right (Wing) Party. The opposition formed a party, calling themselves Left 
(Wing) Party, Venstre (its English translation, Liberal Party, is more in line with its political 
profile today). This Party mainly represented farmers of good economic standing, and was the 
party that formed a government after a long political conflict. The smaller farmers and groups 
of employees and self-employed in the cities were not part of the new party, and they 
responded by forming a new party, Radikale Venstre (Social Liberal Party). This party was, 
and still is, a non-socialist party but lies furthest to the left among the non-socialist parties as a 
whole. It has formed governments together with the Social Democratic Party several times. In 
the two-dimensional classification (shown above) it occupies position 3 while the Liberal 
Party and the Conservative Party can be assigned to position 2 or 1.  
 
Socialdemokratiet (Social Democratic Party) is a party of the type that also occurs in the 
other Scandinavian countries and other countries in Western Europe. It was established as far 
back as the 1870s, relying mainly on the votes of the blue-collar workers. Between 1924 and 
2001 it was the party enjoying the largest electoral support. As in several other countries, the 
left wing of the Social Democratic Party formed a communist party of its own after the 
Russian revolution. The Communist Party divided into two in the wake of the Hungarian 
                                                 
10 The English translation of the names of the Danish political parties varies. We mainly follow the version used 
by Statistics Denmark.  
  5uprising in 1956. A Soviet-critical fraction formed the Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist 
People’s Party), which ultimately became the larger of the two breakaway groups. In the 
1990s, the Communist party entered into an alliance with other small parties on the left to 
form Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne (Unity List). In the two dimensional classification the 
Social Democratic Party takes position 5, while the Socialist People’s Party position 6. The 
same position applies for the Unity List.  
 
Two new parties appeared in 1973, both of them as parties of protest. At first the main issue at 
stake for the Centrum-Demokraterne (Centre Democratic Party) was the property tax. This is 
a non-socialist party in the middle of the political spectrum, and it has joined governments 
both under the Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party, but also governments led 
by the Social Democratic Party. A second party founded in 1973, Fremskridtspartiet 
(Progress Party), began as a party of protest against income tax and the large public sector. 
Later, immigrants and immigration became its main interest. It is one of the two anti-
immigration parties. In 1995 internal conflict led to a split and the formation of a new party, 
Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party). This party gradually out-competed the Progress 
Party, soon becoming the dominating anti-immigration party. It is strongly anti-immigration, 
but supports the welfare state (for native Danes). Kristeligt Folkeparti (Christian People’s 
Party) was founded in 1970, and has at various times been represented in Parliament and even 
in the government. It is a non-socialist party, but it has been part of the government under 
both the Liberal Party and Conservative People’s Party, as well as under Social Democratic 
Party. In the two-dimensional classification shown above they take the following positions: 
For the Centre Democratic Party position 2, for the Progress Party position 1, Danish 
People’s Party position 4, Christian People’s Party position 2.
11  
 
To be represented in Parliament a party has to win 2 per cent of the votes at an election. This 
is a low hurdle compared with many other European countries, and it means that in most 
periods many parties are represented in local and national assemblies, but most of them by a 
few seats only. In practice there are two possible government-forming alternatives. The left 
alternative implies a coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal 
Party with support in Parliament from the Socialist People’s Party and the Unity List. The 
other alternative, on the right, implies a coalition between the Liberal Party and the 
                                                 
11 We will not discuss why anti-immigration sentiments have been particularly strong in Denmark. See Hervik 
(2004) for a discussion on the origins of Danish xenophobia.  
  6Conservative People’s Party together with support in Parliament from the Danish People’s 
Party and one or more of the small non-socialist parties. This means that the Danish People’s 
Party may be able to influence policy-making, for example regarding immigration policy, 
when the Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party have formed a joint government. 
 
Analysis 
Our purpose here is to determine the impact on election results of an influx of immigrants to 
Denmark during the 1990s. We thus conduct regression estimations, taking the vote shares of 
the individual political parties as the dependent variables. Regional diversity within a 
municipality’s population, and the impact of this on the formation of local policy outcomes 
have been frequently studied; see Gerdes (2008) and Hopkins (2006), and the references 
given there. In the present paper, we look at election outcomes and ask whether there has been 
a reaction to the influx of persons of non-native origin in terms of an increase or a drop in 
support for the various parties.  
 
Regression estimations will be the main tool to disentangle the impact of immigration on 
voting outcomes, but we will also conduct a variance decomposition of vote shares by party. 
We will decompose voting patterns with a view to measuring the extent to which votes are 
locally, or nationally, determined. As we are interested in the impact on election outcomes of 
a change in the resident composition in municipalities, an evaluation of the significance of 
regional issues in general in determining the parties’ vote shares could be revealing. To this 
end, we turn to Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) and Morgenstern and Swindle (2005), who 
seek to clarify the determinants of what they call “the local vote”. This vote can be affected 
by a variety of factors, such as the popularity of a candidate in a constituency, or the particular 
design of an electoral system. The decomposition technique does not distinguish between 
these aspects, i.e., whether the “vote is targeted toward an individual candidate, applied to a 
party list, or distributed among multiple party candidates” (Morgenstern and Swindle, 2005, 
p. 146). However, advantage of such a decomposition technique for our study is that it allows 
us to create a comparable measure for the importance of local issues in the two election 
cycles. Hence, we are not concerned here with disentangling the importance of the nature of 
underlying causes, but with using the amounts thus calculated in the variance decomposition 
in order to reveal “the degree to which voters are influenced by factors particular to their 
districts”. See Morgenstern and Swindle (2005), p. 145. 
  7Local vote and national trends 
We will now apply the variance decomposition, as described by Morgenstern and Potthoff 
(2005). These author’s decomposition of electoral variance posits three elements: the district 
time effect (the “local vote”), district heterogeneity (the inconsistency of party support across 
districts) and volatility (the national trend, expressing the variance in overall party support 
over time). They use all three measures to formulate a classification of parties across 
countries. As we are primarily interested in using the local vote as a setting for our regression 
analysis, we do not adopt this classification. Nor will we comment on the impact of district 
heterogeneity as this departs from the assumption of “districts…drawn randomly from a 
superpopulation” (Morgenstern and Potthoff, 2005, p. 25). As not all the parties that we study 
submitted candidates in a number of the electoral wards, the assumption of a random draw 
would not hold water.
12 We will focus on the local vote, but will also touch on volatility, i.e., 
the part of the variance that is explained by time trends in the cross-municipality dimension.  
 
The estimations of variance components for each party in each election cycle are attained 
according to the following formula: For the district time it is given by 
(i)   =
2 σ
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where K is the number of elections, I is the number of districts (in our case the municipalities) 
and “the dot subscript (e.g. in  k y. ) indicates the average over the replaced index” 
(Morgenstern and Potthoff, 2005, p. 24). 
 
As some of the parties that we studied are rather small, and are occasionally absent from some 
of the municipalities, we will not comment on absolute values for the local vote (which are in 
fact considerably smaller for the smaller parties). Rather, we will study the relative outcomes 
                                                 
12 The calculation of variance components with respect to local vote and national trend are not sensitive to the 
validity of such assumptions, see p. 24 in Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005). 
  8for each party in local government and general elections.
13 The results of this decomposition 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
Morgenstern and Swindle (2005) look at general election outcomes for political parties in 23 
countries, among them the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party in Denmark, during 
the period 1971-1998. Their measure for the size of the local vote in the Danish general 
elections differs somewhat from our estimates, but these (fairly small) differences can be 
explained the slightly shorter period covered here, and by the fact that the authors use voting 
results at the county level, while we look at the municipal level. 
 
The variance assigned to the local vote is generally greater in local government elections than 
in elections to the national Parliament, i.e., the ratios of the respective figures are greater than 
one, see Table 1. This lends support to the contention that issues of genuine local concern 
should be given more weight in elections to local governments than to general elections. A 
notable exception here is the ratio for the Progress Party. For this party the variance 
connected with factors determined on a local basis is greater in general elections than in local 
government elections. Further, the local vote in local municipality elections is larger on the 
whole for parties on the left, i.e., the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People’s 
Party, and for the more centre-oriented Social Liberal Party. The exception is the group of 
parties furthest to the left of the political spectrum, known as the Unity List. However, for the 
Unity List we have observations for 33 municipalities only, which makes it hard to draw any 
valid conclusions. As regards parties more towards the right of the political spectrum, the 
Conservative People’s Party and the Danish People’s Party both receive a somewhat smaller 
local vote in local government elections than in national elections. 
 
An examination of the impact of national time trends (denoted “volatility”) on election 
outcomes yields the following results. First, there is a considerable amount of variety in the 
outcome for the different parties, suggesting that parties to the left of the Social Democratic 
Party, i.e., the Socialist People’s Party and the Unity List, are far more receptive to national 
                                                 
13 Following Morgenstern and Potthoff (2005) we make the restriction that for any election district (i.e., 
municipality) included at least two observations must be made in both election series. As regards the location of 
parties on a left-right scale, we adopt the classification proposed in Huber and Ingelhart (1995). 
  9trends in elections to local governments than they are in general elections. This is equally true 
of the Social Liberal Party.
14 Bearing these results in mind, we will now turn to regression 
estimations to explore the impact of immigration on election outcomes. 
The effect of a change in the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ on 
election outcomes in Danish municipalities 
We will now describe a series of regression estimations in which the election outcomes for 
each party, expressed as a percentage, are the dependent variables. A number of critical 
questions regarding the formulation of the estimation model first have to be addressed. The 
dependent variable simply accounts for votes on a dichotomous basis, indicating that party i 
either did or did not get a vote.
15 Aggregate data based on individual decisions that are 
intrinsically binary (sometimes called proportions data; see Greene, 2003, section 21.4.6), is 
accompanied by certain estimation problems. These concern in particular the question of how 
to set up an appropriate model that takes such an outcome as its dependent variable, and the 
according assumption on the underlying distribution that one should utilize in stating 
significance of achieved estimators. 
 
According to Greene (2003) the appropriate way of treating proportions data that comes in as 
the dependent variable is to use the log odds, or logit, adopting regression methods (or 
maximum likelihood methods) to measure the effect of the covariates; see Greene (2003), p. 
686. Thus the dependent variable in the estimations should be expressed as the logarithmic of 














ln ~ , where the observed  in our setting is the proportion of votes for 
party  i  in a given municipality. A model defined in this way is linear in its arguments: 
i P
ε β + ′ = i x y ~ . One crucial question concerns the way in which the distribution of ε  should be 
handled. One standard procedure described in the literature is to assume an independent and 
identical distribution of the error termε , such that ( )
2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε IID it .
16 In the estimations 
                                                 
14 The Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party formed national governments most of the time from 
1993 to 2001. 
15 This means that we have simplified the decision process as we disregard the fact that the choice lies not simply 
between two alternatives, but between a number of different parties. However, the choice of alternatives is not 
constant across municipalities and time, which makes an approach of using choice dependent marginal effects 
(like a multinomial logit approach) rather troublesome. 
16 See also the discussion in Kieschnick and McCullough (2003) on related estimation issues. They argue that 
one should consider using other estimation models than a linear or log linear, but given the choice between those 
  10presented in the present paper we adopt a slightly different approach in order to keep the 
model as simple as possible. We do this by using the logarithm of   as the dependent 
variable instead, which could be read as (log of) the “probability” of a party receiving a 
vote.
i P
17 The covariate of main interest, i.e., the share of non-Western immigrants within 
municipalities, is also included in its logarithmic form. This allows us to read the  -
coefficient as follows: a one percent increase in the share of non-Western immigrants leads to 




We adopt a “fixed-effect”- estimation approach, which means as well as time dummies we 
also control for municipality heterogeneity by holding constant for municipality fixed effects. 
Due to these controls, the variance that remains “unexplained” can be attributed to district-
time effects similar to the “local vote” described in the previous section.
18 The explanatory 
variable of particular interest for us is the effect of (a change in) the (log) share of first-
generation non-Western immigrants. By considering this particular group of immigrants we 
seek to “target” individuals who were subject to the Danish dispersal policy. The aim of this 
policy was to distribute the newly arrived refugees over the whole of Denmark, and especially 
in areas where the immigrant population had hitherto been rather small. Earlier studies have 
shown that the distribution was more or less “random” when conditioned on a number of 
structural and demographic factors. In our estimations we seek to control for such factors by 
including variables for municipal averages regarding age, number of children per household 
and income from labour.
19 Even so, it is not possible on a basis of such estimations to assess 
an overall exogenous change in the composition of the local population, since we cannot 
control for immigrant status or time of arrival in Denmark. Moreover, we cannot ignore the 
possibility that a particular election outcome could have changed the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ in that community, which would introduce some endogeneity into the 
estimations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
two alternatives they deduce that “a linear regression on a logit transformed dependent variable is preferable to a 
linear regression on a nontransformed variable”, Kieschnick and McCullough (2003), p. 211. 
17 Estimation results following from a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable, i.e., using 
( i i P P − 1 ln ) , are rather similar to those presented here. 
18 However, correspondence is not complete, since we use logarithmic outcome variables rather than values in 
pure levels in the regression estimations, which affects the variance decomposition. However, as the log 
transformation is a continuous and monotonically increasing operation, changes are on an ordinal scale.   
19 A more detailed discussion of various aspects of the dispersal policy can be found in Gerdes (2008) and in the 
references given in that work.  
  11To allow for these possibilities we also apply an instrumental variable approach. Ideally we 
would have liked to have used the number of refugees assigned to the individual 
municipalities as our instrument for the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’, but no such 
figures are included in the official registers. Instead we use the number of refugees who 
received social assistance in the course of a given year. The logic behind this runs as follows: 
Before 1999 all refugees were entitled to what was known as “Kontanthjælp” from the 
municipalities in which the refugees had their place of residence. Assuming that most refugee 
newcomers would be receiving such help to begin with, this number can represent our 
approximation for the number of refugees assigned to the municipality. We allow for the 
alteration in 1999, whereby “Kontanthjælp” was replaced by another scheme – known as 
“Introduktionsydelse” – by using time-lagged figures. In particular, the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ in one year is instrumented by the number of recipients of Kontanthjælp three 
years before. Given that our instrument is valid such estimations will allow us to make certain 
claims as to the causal effect of immigration on party votes. Consequently, so long as we are 
commenting on simple regression analysis, we will stick to the notion of measuring an 
associative effect instead. 
 
The data used here has been taken from Statistics Denmark, while the data regarding election 
outcomes for the general elections to the national Parliament (the Folketing), come from 
various publications issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Health.   
 
It could be objected that the covariate of main interest, namely the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ in the municipality, could seize the vote of the immigrant population themselves. 
The scope for such confounding effect is not very great, however, since new immigrants from 
countries outside the EU (and the Nordic countries), i.e., those we identify as non-Western 
immigrants, are not entitled to vote in local elections until they have had three years of 
(permanent) residence in Denmark, while for voting in national elections Danish citizenship is 
required – among others requiring at least nine years residence in the country.
20 Following 
from the fixed-effect set up, we take account of changes rather than levels within 
municipalities, which means that groups of immigrants of non-Western origin who have been 
living in the same municipality throughout the studied period will not affect the coefficient 
estimate for ‘share of non-Western immigrants’. 
                                                 
20 See p. 8 in Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2003). 
  12 
Another rationale for applying fixed-effect estimations is as follows: If municipalities have 
time-invariant characteristics that affect outcome variables other than those explicitly 
controlled for, any estimation of the coefficient vectorβ  for the explanatory variables xit 
would be subject to omitted variable bias in case no municipality controls were included. In 
this kind of estimation set-up, reported coefficient estimates of (time varying) covariates will 
give the change in the dependent variable associated with a change in these explanatory 
variables.  
 
The fixed-effect estimator can be written as follows (see also Verbeek (2000), p. 313): 
(iii)  ) ( ) ( ' . . . i it i it i it x x y y ε ε β − + − = − ,  where  ( )
2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε IID it .  
Here xit are (time-varying) control variables, including the measure of ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’. Starting from equation (iii) the regression coefficients are estimated by:  



























ˆ & & & & & & & & β
where  ) ( . i it i x x x − = & &  and ) ( . i it i y y y − = & & . 
 
Following from the preceding discussion estimations are conducted by estimating 
() () ) ( ) ( ' ln ln . . i it t i it it it x x P P ε ε λ β − + + − = − , where  is the vote share for a given party in 
municipality i at time t, where
it P P
t λ is a time dummy indicator. 
 
Assuming that the control variables are independent of all εit, the regression estimations will 
be unbiased. More specifically, it is required that  0 ) , ( = is it x Cov ε& & & &  for all t and s, so that party 
vote shares at period t in one municipality will not affect ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ 
in period t+1, t+2, …, t+k.  
 
Further, in the estimation we treat all the municipalities in the same way, which means that 
we do not weight them according to population size. As our dependent variables are local 
government election outcomes, it is reasonable to measure events and political currents that 
treat all the municipalities as separate, social entities.
21 The covariates, besides of the share of 
                                                 
21  Thomsen (2003) uses aggregate data for Denmark to look at voter turnout. Examining data for municipalities 
and polling stations, he suggests a weighting approach based on population size. However, he points out this is 
  13non-Western immigrants in the default model are age, number of children in the household 
and labour income. We cover a period that includes four local government elections and four 
general elections between 1989 and 2001. Standard deviations are weighted (“clustered”) with 
respect to municipalities. The panels are not balanced, i.e., the number of observations for a 
party may not always be the same over all four elections. To facilitate a comparison of all the 
parties’ election results over time, we show the party outcomes in Figure 1. The mean values 
of the covariates can be found in Table A2. 
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
Estimation results 
A look at the coefficient estimates reveals the rather big variation in both significance levels 
and the signs of the estimated association between (a change in) the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ and (a change in) vote shares in local elections and the respective result 
regarding general elections, see Table 2 column1 (1) and (2). Some parties show significant 
results in both series of election outcomes, others in one only or in none. Here we will present 
the results along the degree of significance for the respective coefficient estimates in local 
government and general elections. Throughout the discussion we denote significance by t-
statistics that pass a two-sided significance threshold of 10 percent.
22
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
Among the parties that show significant results as regards the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ in both election outcomes, we find the Conservative People’s Party and the 
Progress Party. The coefficient estimates are positive for both parties, albeit somewhat larger 
for the Progress Party. The Conservative People’s Party experienced a considerable decline 
in electoral support in general elections during the period, while its support in elections at the 
local government level remained fairly stable, as can be seen in Figure 1. A general change in 
party support is caught by the time dummies included in the model. This implies that the 
coefficient estimate for the change in non-Western immigrants measures the variation in the 
dependent variable over time that is associated with the variation in the independent variable 
                                                                                                                                                          
mainly because the choice of units is somewhat arbitrary in the study concerned: “If each unit can be viewed as a 
separate social system there is no strong argument why the units should be weighted” (p. 3). 
22 We apply fixed effect estimations by using the “xtreg, fe” command in Stata9.  
  14net of any time trends. Stated differently, the estimated coefficient  indicates the marginal 
effect of a change in ‘share of non-Western immigrants’, holding constant for common time 
trends and other covariates.  
β ˆ
 
The Danish People’s Party is the only party with a significant estimate for the ‘share of non-
Western immigrants’ in elections to local government, but a non-significant estimate in 
general elections. Its coefficient estimate also shows the largest marginal effect of any of the 
parties.  
 
The parties that did not show significant results in elections to local government, but did so in 
general elections are the Christian People’s Party, the Liberal Party, the Social Liberal Party 
and the Socialist People’s Party. In line with customary practice we define significance by a 
p-value smaller than 10 percent. However, if we adopt a somewhat less strict demarcation and 
utilize a 15 percent level instead, the coefficient estimates for the ‘share of non-Western 
immigrant’ covariate would be significant in the elections to local governments for both the 
Liberal Party and the Socialist People’s Party. There is a small but consistently negative 
impact of an increase in the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ for the Liberal Party, while 
there is a positive effect for the Socialist People’s Party. Similarly, estimates for the Social 
Liberal Party are consistently negative and about equal in size, but these are non-significant 
in elections to local government. Finally, for the Christian People’s Party we get a negative 
impact from ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ on vote shares in national elections. If we 
relate these results to the measure of local votes discussed in the preceding section, we find 
that the local vote ratio for the Christian People’s Party is relatively small, i.e., less than two, 
while it is around six or over for the other three parties. This result, together with previous 
findings, suggests that there is no apparent connection between the size of the local vote in 
terms of explained variance on the one hand, and the level of significance of ‘share of non-
Western immigrants’ in the regression estimations on the other.  
 
Finally, the parties that yield non-significant results in both series of elections are the Centre 
Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Unity List. In this last case we have 
observations for 33 municipalities only, which obviously hinder any firm conclusions. For the 
Centre Democratic Party there are 70 applicable observations over time, which also is rather 
a small number. Nonetheless, the coefficient estimates suggest that the influx of non-Western 
  15immigrants did not have any impact on voting outcomes. The same can be said of the Social 
Democratic Party. This last result is interesting as it contradicts the prevalent view that the 
Social Democrats lost votes to the Danish People’s Party because of a growing anti-
immigration mood in the electorate. See for example Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2003), p. 
13. As we have seen, there is rather a large marginal increase in support for the Danish 
People’s Party at local government elections, associated with an influx of non-Western 
immigrants. We would thus have expected to find a corresponding negative relationship for 
the Social Democratic Party in elections to local governments. The rather large amount of 
variance attributed to the local vote and the (very) low weight associated with national time 
trends across municipalities in elections to the local governments, both suggest that the Social 
Democrats were more engaged than other parties in issues determined locally, which may 
have compensated to some extent for more widespread electoral concerns on immigration 
issues. To test the robustness of this hypothesis we also conducted estimations including only 
those municipalities in which the Danish People’s Party run for local government office. 
However, this does not change the main results; i.e., the estimates for the  Social Democratic 
Party are still insignificant as regards the impact of non-Western immigrant shares on election 
outcomes at the level of municipality.
23  
 
The above results thus indicate that local factors, as gauged by the local vote measure, are 
more or less dispensable when it comes to assigning the level of significance of a change in 
‘share of non-Western immigrants’ in elections to the national Parliament. On the other hand, 
as we had previously noted, there was rather a low ratio regarding the strength of the local 
vote in local governmental elections for the parties on the right, i.e., for the Conservative 
People’s Party, the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party. Our regression estimations 
show that all three parties were the only parties revealing significant coefficient estimates as 
regards the effect of the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ in local elections. This finding 
suggests that a marginal increase in vote shares in reaction to an influx of non-Western 
immigrants is negatively related to the strength of a party’s roots in local politics, meaning 
that political mobilization at the national level has been an important factor. We will return to 
this issue in our concluding section. 
                                                 
23  We also applied another restriction, namely including only observations for the elections from 1997 onwards, 
i.e., the election year in which the Danish People’s Party took part in the local elections for the first time, but 
this restriction too had a minor impact only on the results for the Social Democratic Party. Results not shown in 
the paper can be made available by the authors on request. 
  16Checking consistency of regression estimations 
We have already mentioned that the initial distribution of refugees among the municipalities 
was dependent on a number of socio-geographical factors, and that we have tried to take these 
into account by introducing corresponding control variables in the regression model. To 
examine the responsiveness of our regression estimations we also present some regression 
estimations that exclude all covariates apart from time and municipality fixed effects, and 
some that include several other control variables.
24
 
-Table 3 about here- 
 
Comparing the default estimations, i.e., those that include all the controls as shown in Table 2, 
columns (1) and (2), with regression estimation that lack any controls except time and 
municipality dummies in Table 3, columns (1) and (2), we can see that the estimates and the 
levels of significance are similar. The clearest difference compared with the default case 
concerns the Danish People’s Party, which now gets a lower and non-significant coefficient 
estimate in local government elections. 
 
A similar comparison of the default estimation with estimations that include controls 
regarding population density, share of unemployed, share of those over 65 and population size 
in the municipalities (all in logarithms), reveals certain adjustments. See Table 3, columns (3) 
and (4). The main results can be summarized as follows: the coefficient estimate for the 
Christian People’s Party is no longer significant. The change in ‘share of non-Western 
immigrants’ is significant only for election outcomes for the Conservative People’s Party in 
local government elections. As regards the Progress Party there is now a significant effect for 
elections to Parliament only. The coefficient estimates for the other parties are slightly smaller 
than the estimations in the default case. All in all, the augmented control does make a certain 
impact, but it does not refute the earlier results. Rather, it seems as though these additional 
variables control mainly for the variation correlated with larger cities and urban areas. This 
will be further clarified below. 
                                                 
24 Once again, we are not really interested in their actual impact, i.e., the coefficient estimates of the covariates 
apart from ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ are not an issue in this paper. 
  17Changes vs. levels 
Hitherto we have focussed on the effect over time of a change in the composition of various 
immigrant cohorts. While earlier groups of immigrants consisted mainly of labour migrants, 
more recent cohorts consist to a great extent of refugees or family (re)unification migrants. In 
our estimations so far, we have looked at the impact of more recent waves of immigrants 
since we have been focusing on changes in immigrant shares during the 1990s. Thus, a 
question that we have overlooked concerns the meaning of the actual level of the share of 
immigrants. Some recent studies based on interview data from Denmark and Norway 
regarding support for anti-immigration parties, i.e., the Danish People’s Party and the 
Progress Parties (one in each country), found no clear connection between the proportion of 
immigrants in the population of a neighbourhood and anti-immigration sentiments. Rather, 
they stressed the importance of the general political debate about immigration issues to 
attitudes in the electorate (see Bjørklund and Goul Andersen, 2003, p. 11). 
 
Here our purpose is twofold: First, to see whether we can confirm the claim that the actual 
level of the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ is of minor importance only; second, to 
compare estimations based on actual levels with our own results, which focus on the impact 
of changes in such shares in municipalities. Such an approach might pave the way for a more 
nuanced assessment of the underlying mechanisms. 
 
As before, we will seek to explore such effects with the help of regression estimations. 
However, this raises some concern about the consistency of the estimation results obtained, 
particularly because we have to abandon the fixed-effect approach that we have employed up 
to now. The fixed-effect framework implicitly controls for levels in shares by including 
controls for municipality fixed effects.
25 The estimation results that we will now discuss are 
presumably “less reliable” compared to the fixed-effect framework.
26 For example, one 
drawback of OLS estimations is that the votes of citizens of non-Western origin who have 
lived in a Danish municipality for a fairly long time will also be captured in the coefficient 
                                                 
25 For example, by applying a fixed effect approach we implicitly control for urbanization, a factor that has been 
shown to have some impact on voter turnout in elections in Denmark.  See Thomsen (2003). 
26 In general, coefficient estimates acquired from fixed-effects estimations (FE) would be similar to OLS 
estimations, given that there were no time-fixed omitted variables to bias the results in the second case and no 
significant impact from the actual level in ‘share of non-Western immigrants’. Thus, technically, there are no 
substantial differences between the approaches, apart from the emphasis in the estimations on variation over time 
in the FE case following from the control for municipality fixed effects. See Halaby (2004) for a non-technical 
discussion on the pros and cons of fixed-effect estimations.  
  18estimate for ‘share of non-Western immigrants’. For this reason, these estimates should be 
regarded primarily as a complement to the fixed-effect estimations. 
 
Thus, we use simple pooled regression estimations (referred to from now on as OLS). That is 
to say, we abandon separate controls for all municipalities. To control for time trends we 
retain time dummies in the model. The OLS approach means that the within-municipality and 
the cross-municipality variation will both contribute to the identification of the coefficient 
estimates. The results are shown in Table 2, columns (3) and (4).  
 
We get a significant result for the Conservative People’s Party in general elections, but the 
coefficient estimate is somewhat lower than the one that we found in the fixed-effect 
estimations. There are no significant coefficients for the Progress Party, in either of the series 
of elections regarding the levels of the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’. The same holds 
for the Danish People’s Party, i.e., we find no significant results here. Thus, in the case of 
these last two parties, these results confirm those, derived from cross-sectional estimations for 
1993 and 1997 reported by Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2003). 
 
We now turn to the Christian People’s Party, the Liberal Party, the Social Liberal Party and 
the Socialist People’s Party. The results regarding the OLS estimations are rather mixed. We 
find no significant coefficient estimates for the Christian People’s Party and the Social 
Liberal Party, but for the Liberal Party we do get slightly larger (i.e., more negative) and 
significant values for both the local government and the general elections. The pattern is 
similar with regard to the Socialist People’s Party, i.e., there is a larger and even a 
significantly positive effect in the OLS estimations. 
 
In the case of the three parties that did not have significant coefficient estimates for ‘share of 
non-Western immigrants’ in the base line fixed-effect estimation, we find that the measured 
effect of levels are now significant for the Centre Democratic Party and the Unity List. For 
the former the coefficient estimate yields a negative effect from the level of ‘share of non-
Western immigrants’ in local government elections, but not in general elections, while for the 
Unity List there is a significant positive coefficient in general elections, and an almost 
significant positive coefficient estimate in elections to local government. For the Social 
Democratic Party we find no significant results from OLS estimations. 
  19Instrumental variable results 
So far, as noted, we have avoided using the term “causal effect” to guard against possible 
endogeneity due to reverse causality. In technical terms this means that [] 0 , ≠ i i x E ε& & & & , which 
ultimately leads to biased coefficient estimates. To address this problem we also conduct 
some estimations for which we adopt an instrumental variable approach. The two following 
conditions have to be fulfilled to produce a valid instrument. First, the instrument must be 
correlated with the endogenous variable, i.e.,  [ ] 0 , ≠ i i z x Cov & & & &  and, second, it has to be 
exogenous, i.e.,  [] 0 , = i i z E ε& & & & . The instrument we use is linked to the refugee-placement 
policy, as noted earlier. As refugees were entitled to social allowances from arrival in the 
country, the refugees placed in a municipality will also increase the number of refugees there 
who receive such allowances, which ultimately will also reflect changes in the share of non-
Western immigrants in the municipalities.  
 
One drawback of the instrumental variable approach is its larger requirement regarding the 
required number of observations. A commonly used test statistic to examine if this is satisfied 
is to use the F-test from the first step in the ‘Two-step least squares’ framework. According to 
Staiger and Stock (1997) a rule of thumb to avoid small-sample bias is that the statistic should 
be 10 or higher. See Table 4 for results from coefficient estimations and F-test statistics. We 
show the outcomes of instrumental variable estimations in line with the basic model to be 
compared with columns (1) and (2) in Table 2, and an extended model to be compared with 
columns (3) and (4) in Table 3. 
 
-Table 4 about here- 
 
As can be seen, the F-statistics are rather small for parties with few observations. We will not, 
therefore, comment on those outcomes. The Conservative Party does not yield any significant 
coefficients, in contrast with all previous results, indicating that the positive relation between 
the earlier changes in share of non-Western immigrants on their outcomes may have been 
spurious. For the Liberal Party the effects are now highly significant, as well as being much 
more negative. This could be interpreted as meaning that the results of the basic estimations 
were biased towards zero. For the Progress Party we get an indication of a strong effect in 
municipality elections, but no significant result for election to the national Parliament. This 
means that even here the estimated coefficient may have been biased downwards in the 
  20preceding estimations. For the Social Democratic Party everything seems very much the 
same, i.e., no effect from a change in immigrant population on their electoral support at the 
municipal level. The negative effect for the Social Liberal Party is greater, pointing to 
significant effects in both election cycles. The results for the Socialist People’s Party are also 
robust, and the effect is greater than in the basic estimations. 
 
All in all, there are no radical changes compared to our earlier results. However, the estimates 
indicate much greater effects than in non-instrumented estimations. This suggests that 
prevailing endogeneity does actually bias the estimates towards zero. For example, the share 
of non-Western immigrants in municipalities is caused not only by an influx of immigrants, 
but also by natives moving from one municipality to another. Given that this decision is not 
the result of immigrants being placed in their own municipality, this means that we will have 
some (random) noise in our measure for ‘share of non-Western immigrants’. The greater this 
mobility, the greater the downward bias of the coefficient estimates in non-instrumented 
estimations. 
Sensitivity of estimations to metropolitan counties and cities 
We will now look at the impact of various dynamic processes resulting from an inflow of 
immigrants into different municipalities. Social interaction between citizens and among 
neighbours probably works differently in fairly small cities than it does in urban regions.
27 
Here we look at municipalities, in which the number of citizens of foreign origin has been 
rather small from the outset. We do so by studying the sensitivity of our regression outcomes 
to the removal of all municipalities within the county of Copenhagen and the major cities of 
Aalborg,  Aarhus and Odense, i.e., 23 municipalities altogether.
28 The remaining 
municipalities will be less varied as regards the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ and will 
largely comprise municipalities that were subject to the dispersal policy, as refugees were 
primarily placed in counties and municipalities with (from the outset) only a few persons of 
foreign origin. To get a broader view, we conduct both fixed-effect and OLS estimations, as 
shown in Table 5. We have already hinted above that the results of our estimation with the 
larger set of control variables accord fairly well with the one presented here (see by 
                                                 
27 For studies focusing on the importance of factors such as municipality size, see for example Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (1999) and Glaeser (2000). For a detailed discussion of settlement patterns for different groups of 
immigrants in Denmark, see for example Damm, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranaes (2006) and Skifter Andersen 
(2006). 
28 We do not conduct separate estimations for these 23 municipalities, as such estimations would be rather shaky 
and unreliable due to the small number of observations. 
  21comparing columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 with columns (3) and (4) in Table 3). However, for 
reasons of space, we examine the results for the two anti-immigration parties and the two 
largest parties only.  
 
-Table 5 about here- 
 
For the Danish People’s Party the coefficient estimate is somewhat smaller in the fixed-effect 
estimations on local government elections, but still significantly different from zero (see 
column 1). A more striking change is that we now get a significantly negative (!) estimate for 




The most notable changes for the Progress Party are the reductions in the coefficients in the 
fixed-effect estimations, which give us non-significant estimates of a change in the ‘share of 
non-Western immigrants’ in local elections. These changes are quite small, however. 
 
As regards the Liberal Party there are some important differences, as we now have far from 
significant values in local elections, regardless of whether we apply a fixed-effect approach or 
OLS estimations. The outcomes in general elections are not quite as negative, but still 
significant. 
 
Finally, for the Social Democratic Party we now obtain negative coefficients in the OLS 
estimations in elections to local governments as well as in general elections. This indicates 
that a larger part of the ‘share of non-Western immigrants’ is associated with slightly lower 
support, albeit the effect is only slightly significant. At first sight this result lends support to 
the idea that the Social Democrats lost electoral support as a result of an influx of immigrants. 
However, the result is obviously at odds with the decline for the Danish People’s Party that 
we also see here. Such inconsistency confirms our supposition that the OLS estimations are 
“less reliable” than the explicit control for municipality fixed effects.
30  
                                                 
29 Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2003) report that the Danish People’s Party had more support in the cities, 
while the Progress Party had its stronghold in the rural areas. See p. 11. 
30 As another robustness check we also conducted estimations where separate time-trends for the fourteen 
counties were included instead of using nationwide time trends. In general, the effect of such an augmented 
control is that the coefficients become somewhat smaller and occasionally insignificant. This holds true also for 
the two anti-immigration parties, Danish People’s and Progress Party.  However, their coefficient estimates in 
elections to the local government (.114 and .098, respectively) are only marginally inside the region of non-
  22Summing up  
The results reported in the analytical section have revealed the following: 
•  The strength of the individual parties is different in the two types of elections. The 
Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People’s Party and the Social Liberal Party, 
have a relatively stronger local standing in local than in general elections, as measured 
in terms of the “local vote”. The anti-immigration parties, on the other hand, have 
relatively weaker positions. 
•  The anti-immigration Danish People’s Party and Progress Party enjoy support in 
local elections in municipalities with an increased ‘share of non-Western immigrants’. 
The same holds for the Conservative Party, but results become insignificant in the 
instrumental variable set-up in their case.  
•  Overall, the Liberal Party loses from an increase in the immigrant population, when 
holding constant for time trends and other factors. 
•  We do not find any significant effect on the Social Democratic Party from an increase 
in the immigrant share. 
•  Of the two political parties that are most pro-immigration, the Socialist People’s Party 
gain by an increase in the immigrant share in general elections, while the Social 
Liberal Party loses. 
•  The instrumental variable approach indicates that there is scope for downward bias in 
the OLS estimations, indicating that the causal effect of an influx of non-Western 
immigrants might actually be greater than has been stated there.  
Concluding discussion 
In this study we draw attention to the impact of marginal changes in the ethnic diversity of 
local communities. With the help of coefficient estimators we measured a direct effect from 
immigration on the electoral outcomes of the various parties. There may well be some 
underlying indirect effects as well. For example, the decline in voter support for the Social 
Democratic Party in the course of the 1990s (see Figure 1) may have been affected by an 
erosion of electoral support due to a long lasting debate on immigration issues (see e.g. 
Doherty, 2007). However, it will be very difficult to determine the weight of immigration in 
                                                                                                                                                          
rejection, with p-values of somewhat less than 0.12 in both cases. For the Liberal Party and the Social 
Democratic Party the results are rather similar to those shown in the basic setting in Table 2. The number of 
observations are considerably smaller for the two anti-immigration parties, indicating that their larger responses 
to flexible trends over counties is not so much determined by the nature of such  controls, but the result of a 
reduction of the number of degrees of freedom. 
  23the overall time path, since many other factors will have to be taken into account – not least, 
which party or parties form the government, globalization, the EU-debate, or even – as 
suggested by Putnam (2007) – the general change in the forming of social identities. 
 
Due to the variety of parties and the consequent differences in the respective political 
platforms, we are able to draw more specific conclusion about some of the underlying 
mechanisms stemming from a change in the ethnic diversification of local communities. 
Generally speaking, the response to an increase in the immigrant share is associated with a 
mandate for anti-immigration parties in local elections, but there is no clear sign of a more 
general  anti-solidarity effect. We base this last claim on two facts: first, the consistently 
positive estimates for the Socialist People’s Party, being both pro-immigration and pro-
welfare state, and, second, the fact that the Social Democratic Party seems to remain pretty 
unaffected by an marginal increase in the non-Western immigrant share. Like its sister parties 
in other Scandinavian countries, the Social Democratic Party has been a leading player in 
building the Danish welfare state, implying that it has a creditable pro-solidarity stance. This 
result, in combination with the growing support for the anti-immigration parties, suggests that 
Danes show some resentment against immigration, in that they feel solidarity first and 
foremost with their own fellow countrymen, and only secondarily with residents recently 
arrived from foreign countries. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that besides being 
against immigration, the Danish People’s Party’s platform is rather close to traditional Social 
Democratic values regarding the welfare state. Taken together, these results do not support 
the prediction in the study by Lee and Roemer (2006) of a decline in support for the Danish 
welfare state due to an increase in immigration. Things might have looked different if 
Denmark had had a constitutional system based on US-type majority vote rather than its own 
representative parliamentary system. But this is a hypothetical question.
31
 
It could be argued that even supporters of the Social Democratic Party have become more 
critical regarding immigration issues, ultimately forcing the party’s strategists to adjust their 
programme in response to the general feeling in the electorate. However, granted that such a 
process did indeed take place, this has hardly been a development unique to the Social 
Democrats. It is more likely that there has been some shift in the major parties in the direction 
of a slightly more restrictive policy towards immigrants in the wake of a tougher debate on 
                                                 
31 For a detailed theoretical discussion of the impact of polity on policy-formation, see for example Myerson 
(1999), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Persson (2002) and Iversen and Soskice (2006). 
  24the subject, while a few minor parties sought voter support for an openly pro-immigration 
stance. But the relative position of the Social Democratic Party in the overall Danish party 
set-up is roughly the same, i.e., as the party relatively more inclined to redistribution than its 
main contestants in the liberal and conservative camp. Accordingly, any drop in the overall 
“preference for equality” triggered by the influx of non-Western immigrants should result in a 
minus sign for the Social Democrats, but this we do not see.  
 
In this connection it might be interesting to note that the welfare state in Denmark is not only 
extensive; it also commands strong support. In the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP), questions were asked in 27 countries regarding the pride that respondents felt 
regarding different aspects of their country (history, economy, sports, democracy, etc.). In one 
area, Denmark came out top: more people in Denmark than in any other of the 27 countries 
said they were proud of their country’s welfare state (see Larsen, 2008).  
 
This leads us back rather naturally to the question of the very foundations of the immigration 
issue. Hopkins (2006) argues in favour of what he calls the “National Salience” of the debate 
on immigration, for example the extraordinary concentration on the immigrant population as 
that aroused by the Terror attacks of 11 September 2001, while resentments arising from 
direct contact with immigrants and the native population are more of a secondary effect. This 
idea is also supported by Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2003): people seem less influenced 
by direct personal experience of immigrants than by the general political debate about 
immigration. In view of our own findings it thus seems reasonable to conclude that during the 
debate on immigration in Denmark (see also Goul Andersen, 2006), the influx of immigrants 
(i.e., refugees) in the various municipalities brought the immigration issue to the local level, 
and that this in turn made a significant impact on election outcomes in the shape of anti-
immigration sentiments.  
  25Table 1. Determination of the Local Vote and National Trends (Volatility) for major parties in 
Denmark in local government and national elections from 1989 to 2001. 
 
 












70 0.883  1.399  0.646  3.608  1.366 0.388 
Christian People’s 
Party 
98 0.504  0.190  0.361  0.285  1.396 0.668 
Conservative People’s  
Party 
265 13.434  1.210 4.835  12.738  2.778 0.095 
Danish People’s 
Party*** 
123 1.355 1.349 0.509  11.896  2.664 0.113 
Liberal Party  272 23.475  13.416  3.933  40.253  5.968 0.333 
Progress Party  207 2.725 6.085 2.936  8.837  0.928 0.689 
Social Democratic 
Party 
275 21.742  1.769 3.067  11.632  7.088 0.152 
Social Liberal Party  166 3.297 0.496 0.503  0.289  6.560 1.713 
Socialist People’s 
Party  
196 6.204 1.424 0.423  0.434  14.664 3.279 
Unity List  33 0.224  0.313  0.064  0.189  3.508 1.655 
•  * Observations: The number of municipalities in the calculations. ** The Ratio is estimated by dividing 
the figure in local elections by the respective figure for the general elections. ***Approximated by 
assuming three periods of observations. A calculation accounting for (the true) two periods results in an 
estimate that is both negative and almost zero as regards the volatility effect.  
•  The (original) Danish party names in order of appearance are respectively: Centrum-Demokraterne, 
Kristeligt Folkeparti, Konservative Folkeparti, Dansk Folkeparti, Venstre, Fremskridtspartiet, 
Socialdemokratiet, Radikale Venstre, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne. 
 
  26Table 2. Fixed-effect and Pooled OLS regression estimations.  
   Fixed-effect estimations  Pooled regression estimations 
   Local elections  General elections  Local elections  General elections 





































.765  -0.108 
(0.105) 











.165  0.001 
(0.047) 
.549  -0.042* 
(0.023) 
.501 -0.064   
(0.083) 







.158  0.062*** 
(0.023) 
.767  0.042*** 
(0.015) 
.225 0.003   
(0.034) 







.147  0.204*** 
(0.074) 
.893  0.021 
(0.035) 
.019 0.042   
(0.061) 






.370  -0.024 
(0.016) 
.899  -0.049*** 
(0.007) 
.382 -0.080**  
(0.033) 






.790  0.115** 
(0.052) 
.884  0.098*** 
(0.031) 
.671 0.024   
(0.035) 







.118  0.002 
(0.013) 
.834  -0.001 
(0.004) 
.173 -0.001  
(0.022) 







.032  -0.046 
(0.048) 
.418  -0.057*** 
(0.016) 
.094 -0.056  
(0.054) 







.170  0.043 
(0.029) 
.543  0.044*** 
(0.012) 
.139 0.096***   
(0.033) 
.332 0.074***   
(0.023) 
Unity List  86 
33 
.326  -0.231 
(0.251) 
.718  -0.002 
(0.071) 
.408 0.335   
(0.208) 
.593 0.310*   
(0.157) 
  Other controls besides year and municipalities fixed effects are: municipality averages for 
age (for those of age 18 or older), labour income and number of children in household. 
1 Observations: The number of municipalities in the calculations times years of observation for each municipality 
(actual number of municipalities in Italic style); at least 2 time observation for each municipality. Adjusted 
standard errors for municipality clusters. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
  27Table 3. Fixed-effect regression estimations. Consistency check. 
  No control variables besides 
municipalities fixed effects. 
Adding control variables beside of those 
shown in Table 2 
   Local elections  General elections  Local elections  General elections 







































.730  -0.135   
(0.108) 











.150  -0.018   
(0.049) 











.151  0.050**   
(0.024) 











.020  0.114   
(0.071) 










.344  -0.039**  
(0.015) 










.768  0.141**   
(0.057) 











.106  0.008   
(0.013) 











.017  -0.041   
(0.048) 











.172  0.043   
(0.030) 






Unity List  86 
33 
.285  -0.321   
(0.246) 






    Additional control for population density, the 
share of unemployed, the share of person 
above the age of 65 and population size 
within municipalities 
1 Observations: The number of municipalities in the calculations times years of observation for each municipality 
(actual number of municipalities in Italic style); at least two observations for each municipality. Adjusted 
standard errors for municipality clusters. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
  28Table 4. Two-stage Instrumental variable estimations. 
   Instrumental variable approach 
   Control variables as in Table 2  Additional control variables included 
   Local elections  General elections  Local elections  General elections 


























0.75  1.202   
(2.104) 




.062   
(2.105) 







9.19  -.206   
(.180) 
  -.203*  
(.118) 
6.52  -.266    
(.237) 







25.28   .106    
(.119) 




.056    
(.143) 







1.19  .730    
(.982) 
  -.299    
(.395) 
1.16  .501    
(.912) 






24.89  -.285***   
(.106) 
  -.175***   
(.052) 
17.43  -.286**   
(.129) 






12.56  .822**   
(.324) 




.729*   
(.393) 







22.99  -.020   
(.061) 
  .017    
(.024) 
16.29  -.001    
(.073) 







13.53  -.371*   
(.222) 
  -.505***   
(.189) 
9.72  -.306    
(.257) 







20.39  .218    
(.135) 
  .219***   
(.073) 
14.12  .138    
(.159) 
  .214**   
(.098) 
Unity List  86 
33 
2.57  .636   
(1.094) 
  -.144    
(.425) 
2.66  .118    
(.977) 
  -.138    
(.435) 
    Additional control for population density, the 
share of unemployed, the share of person 
above the age of 65 and population size 
within municipalities 
1 Observations: The number of municipalities in the calculations times years of observation for each municipality 
(actual number of municipalities in Italic style); at least two observations for each municipality. Adjusted 
standard errors for municipality clusters. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. F-stat is 
the F-statistic in the first stage estimation, testing for a weak instrument. 
  29Table 5. Fixed-effect and Pooled OLS regression estimations. Excluding metropolitan 
counties and cities. 
   Fixed-effect estimations  Pooled regression estimations 
   Local elections  General elections  Local elections  General elections 







































.745  -0.066    
(0.096) 
.962  0.063   
(0.057) 
.399  -0.333**    
(0.157) 







.213  0.030   
(0.048) 
.575  -0.030   
(0.022) 
.421 0.026   
(0.085) 







.145  0.055**   
(0.025) 
.757  0.033**   
(0.015) 
.140  0.002   
(0.035) 







.191  0.132**   
(0.066) 
.902  -0.002    
(0.036) 
.019  -0.069   
(0.072) 






.313  -0.003   
(0.014) 
.908  -0.034***   
(0.006) 
.279  -0.019   
(0.026) 






.751  0.078   
(0.054) 
.878  0.079**   
(0.031) 
.627  0.026   
(0.036) 







.130  0.006   
(0.013) 
.835  0.0003    
(0.005) 
.160 -0.039**     
(0.020) 







.001  -0.026   
(0.051) 
.386  -0.037**   
(0.016) 
.110  0.034   
(0.054) 







.138  0.025   
(0.030) 
.520  0.029**   
(0.012) 
.107 0.090**     
(0.037) 
.269 0.055**     
(0.025) 
Unity List  55 
21 
.254  -0.233   
(0.307) 
.723  0.033   
(0.082) 
.065  -0.018   
(0.355) 
.298  0.014   
(0.196) 
  Other controls besides year and municipalities fixed effects are: municipality averages for 
age (for those of age 18 or older), labour income and number of children in household. 
1 Observations: The number of municipalities in the calculations times years of observation for each municipality 
(actual number of municipalities in Italics); at least two observations for each municipality. Adjusted standard 
errors for municipality clusters. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 









































































































































Note: Numbers for local elections according to Statistics Denmark.
          Numbers on general elections by Ministry of the Interior and Health.
Elections to local government councils and Parliament
Election Results on Municipality Level
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Table A1 Percentage distribution of votes in the elections to the Danish Parliament 1987-2005 
  1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 
Centre Democratic Party  4.8 4.7 5.1 2.8 4.3 1.8 1.0 
Christian People’s Party  2.4 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.3  
Conservative People’s  Party  20.8 19.3 16.0 15.0 8.9  9.1  10.3 
Danish People’s Party      7.4  12.0  13.3 
Liberal Party  10.5 11.8 15.8 23.3 24.0 31.2 29.0 
Progress Party  4.8 9.0 6.4 6.4 2.4 0.6  
Social Democratic Party  29.3 29.8 37.4 34.6 35.9 29.1 25.8 
Social Liberal Party  6.2 5.6 3.5 4.6 3.9 5.2 9.2 
Socialist People’s Party   14.6  13.0  8.3 7.3 7,6 6.4 6.0 
Unity List      1.7 3.1 2.7 2.4 3.4 
Note. The numbers do not add up to 100 for each election due to that also other mainly small parties have taken 




  35Table A2. Demographic background factors for those municipalities where respective parties 
received a share of votes in elections to the local government. 

































































































.007   .009  .016  Conservative 






























































   Party vote share         123  .079     
  36     general election       (.021) 

























































































































































   Party vote share    .045        .046         .050     
  37local election
3     (.0391)   (.037)  (.038) 







































































.020 .028  Unity List  Share non-west. 
Immigrants 

































1 Observations: The number of municipalities used in the calculations. 
2 Background factors regarding the year 1994 for municipalities where the Danish People’s Party received vote 
shares in 1997. 
3 Results for local government election for the years 1989, 1993 and 2001.  
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